35. TOLERATION OF THE INTOLERANT
Let us now consider whether justice requires the toleration of the
intolerant, and if so under what conditions. There are a variety of
situations in which this question arises. Some political parties in
democratic states hold doctrines that commit them to suppress the
constitutional liberties whenever they have the power. A~ain, there
are those who reject intellectual freedom but who nevertheless hold
positions in the university. It may appear that toleration in these
cases is inconsistent with the principles of justice, or at any rate not required by them. I shall discuss the matter in connection with
religious toleration. With appropriate alterations the argument can
be extended to these other instances.
Several questions should be distinguished. First, there is the question
whether an intolerant sect has any title to complain if it is not
tolerated; second, under what conditions tolerant sects have a right
not to tolerate those which are intolerant; and last, when they have
the right not to tolerate them, for what ends it should be exercised.
Beginning with the first question, it seems that an intolerant sect
has no title to complain when it is denied an equal liberty. At least
this follows if it is assumed that one has no title to object to the
conduct of others that is in accordance with principles one would
use in similar circumstances to justify one's actions toward them. A
person's right to complain is limited to violations of principles he
acknowledges himself. A complaint is a protest addressed to another
in good faith. It claims a violation of a principle that both parties
accept. Now, to be sure, an intolerant man will say that he acts in
good faith and that he does not ask anything for himself that he
denies to others. His view, let us suppose, is that he is acting on the
principle that God is to be obeyed and the truth accepted by all.
This principle is perfectly general and by acting on it he is not
making an exception in his own case. As he sees the matter, he is
following the correct principle which others reject.
The reply to this defense is that, from the standpoint of the
anginal position, no particular interpretation of religious truth can
be acknowledged as binding upon citizens generally; nor can it be
agreed that there should be one authority with the right to settle
questions of theological doctrine. Each person must insist upon an
equal right to decide what his religious obligations are. He cannot
give up this right to another person or institutional authority. In
fact, a man exercises his liberty in deciding to accept another as an
authority even when he regards this authority as infallible, since in
doing this he in no way abandons his equal liberty of conscience
as a matter of constitutional law. For this liberty as secured by
justice is imprescriptible: a person is always free to change his faith
and this right does not depend upon his having exercised his powers
of choice regularly or intelligently. We may observe that men's having an equal liberty of conscience is consistent with the idea that all men ought to obey God and accept the truth. The problem of liberty is that of choosing a principle by which the claims men make on one another in the name of their religion are to be regulated.
Granting that God's will should be followed and the truth
recognized does not as yet define a principle of adjudication. From
the fact that God's intention is to be complied with, it does not follow that any person or institution has authority to interfere with
another's interpretation of his religious obligations. This religious
principle justifies no one in demanding in law or politics a greater
liberty for himself. The only principles which authorize claims on
institutions are those that would be chosen in the original position.
Let us suppose, then, that an intolerant sect has no title to complain
of intolerance. We still cannot say that tolerant sects have the
right to suppress them. For one thing, others may have a right to
complain. They may have this right not as a right to complain on
behalf of the intolerant, but simply as a right to object whenever a
principle of justice is violated. For justice is infringed whenever
equal liberty is denied without sufficient reason. The question, then,
is whether being intolerant of another is grounds enough for limiting
someone's liberty. To simplify things, assume that the tolerant sects
have the right not to tolerate the intolerant in at least one circumstance, namely, when they sincerely and with reason believe that intolerance is necessary for their own security. This right follows readily enough since, as the original position is defined, each would agree to the right of self-preservation. Justice does not require that men must stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence.
Since it can never be to men's advantage, from a general point
of view, to forgo the right of self-protection, the only question, then,
is whether the tolerant have a right to curb the intolerant when they
are of no immediate danger to the equal liberties of others.
Suppose that, in some way or other, an intolerant sect comes to
exist within a well-ordered society accepting the two principles of
justice. How are the citizens of this society to act in regard to it?
Now certainly they should not suppress it simply because the members of the intolerant sect could not complain were they to do so. Rather, since a just constitution exists, all citizens have a natural
duty of justice to uphold it. We are not released from this duty
whenever others are disposed to act unjustly. A more stringent condition is required: there must be some considerable risks to our own legitimate interests. Thus just citizens should strive to preserve the constitution with all its equal liberties as long as liberty itself and
their own freedom are not in danger. They can properly force the
intolerant to respect the liberty of others, since a person can be
required to respect the rights established by principles that he would
acknowledge in the original position. But when the constitution
itself is secure, there is no reason to deny freedom to the intolerant.
The question of tolerating the intolerant is directly related to that
of the stability of a well-ordered society regulated by the two principles.
We can see this as follows. It is from the position of equal
citizenship that persons join the various religious associations, and
it is from this position that they should conduct their discussions
with one another. Citizens in a free society should not think one
another incapable of a sense of justice unless this is necessary for
the sake of equal liberty itself. If an intolerant sect appears in a wellordered society, the others should keep in mind the inherent stability of their institutions. The liberties of the intolerant may persuade them to a belief in freedom. This persuasion works on the psychological principle that those whose liberties are protected by and who benefit from a just constitution will, other things equal, acquire an allegiance to it over a period of time (§ 72). So even if an intolerant sect should arise, provided that it is not so strong initially that it can impose its will straightway, or does not grow so rapidly that the psychological principle has no time to take hold, it will tend to lose its intolerance and accept liberty of conscience. This is the consequence of the stability of just institutions, for stability means that when tendencies to injustice arise other forces will be called into play that work to preserve the justice of the whole arrangement. Of course, the intolerant sect may be so strong initially or growing so fast that the forces making for stability cannot convert it to liberty. This situation presents a practical dilemma which philosophy alone cannot resolve. Whether the liberty of the intolerant should be
limited to preserve freedom under a just constitution depends on
the circumstances. The theory of justice only characterizes the just
constitution, the end of political action by reference to which practical decisions are to be made. In pursuing this end the natural
strength of free institutions must not be forgotten, nor should it be supposed that tendencies to depart from them go unchecked and
always win out. Knowing the inherent stability of a just constitution,
members of a well-ordered society have the confidence to limit the
freedom of the intolerant only in the special cases when it is necessary
for preserving equal liberty itself.
The conclusion, then, is that while an intolerant sect does not
itself have title to complain of intolerance, its freedom should be
restricted only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe
that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in
danger. The tolerant should curb the intolerant only in this case.
The leading principle is to establish a just constitution with the
liberties of equal citizenship. The just should be guided by the
principles of justice and not by the fact that the unjust cannot complain.
Finally, it should be noted that even when the freedom of the
intolerant is limited to safeguard a just constitution, this is not done
in the name of maximizing liberty. The liberties of some are not
suppressed simply to make possible a greater liberty for others.
Justice forbids this sort of reasoning in connection with liberty as
much as it does in regard to the sum of advantages. It is only the
liberty of the intolerant which is to be limited, and this is done for
the sake of equal liberty under a just constitution the principles of
which the intolerant themselves would acknowledge in the original
position.
The argument in this and the preceding sections suggests that the
adoption of the principle of equal liberty can be viewed as a limiting
case. Even though their differences are profound and no one
knows how to reconcile them by reason, men can, from the standpoint
of the original position, still agree on this principle if they can
agree on any principle at all. This idea which arose historically
with religious toleration can be extended to other instances. Thus
we can suppose that the persons in the original position know that
they have moral convictions although, as the veil of ignorance requires, they do not know what these convictions are. They understand that the principles they acknowledge are to override these beliefs when there is a conflict; but otherwise they need not revise their opinions nor give them up when these principles do not uphold them.
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