How does Scanlonian Contractualism differ from other social contract theories? Contractarianism, Kantian contractualism, Rawlsian Contractualism.

2. How does Scanlonian Contractualism differ from other social contract theories? Contractarianism, Kantian contractualism, Rawlsian Contractualism.

Contractualism appeals to the idea of a social contract. It attempts to derive the content of morality (and, in some versions, also the justification for holding that we are obligated to follow morality) from the notion of an agreement between all those in the moral domain. Contemporary moral philosophy offers several other interpretations of the social contract tradition. It is useful to distinguish Scanlonian Contractualism from these alternatives.

Contractarianism has its roots in Hobbes, whose account is based on mutual self-interest. Morality consists in those forms of cooperative behaviour that it is mutually advantageous for self-interested agents to engage in. (The most prominent modern exponent is David Gauthier. See Gauthier 1986.)

By contrast, any form of contractualism is grounded on the equal moral status of persons. It interprets this moral status as based on their capacity for rational autonomous agency. According to contractualism, morality consists in what would result if we were to make binding agreements from a point of view that respects our equal moral importance as rational autonomous agents. Contractualism has its roots in Rousseau, rather than Hobbes: the general will is what we would jointly will if we adopted the perspective of free and equal citizens. Contractualism offers an alternative to contractarianism. Under contractarianism, I seek to maximise my own interests in a bargain with others. Under contractualism, I seek to pursue my interests in a way that I can justify to others who have their own interests to pursue.

We next distinguish two broad classes of contractualist theory: Kantian and Scanlonian. Kantian contractualists seek principles to which all rational agents would agree, under certain idealised conditions. In order to reach such an agreement, Kant notoriously needs to abstract away from many (some would say too many) concrete features of our moral lives. (See Onora O'Neill's gloss on the notion of agreement in Kantian ethics; O'Neill 2003).

Scanlon's account differs from Kant in various respects. In particular, it offers a substantive account of the normative force of morality, based on the value of a relation of mutual respect. Reasonableness is not taken to be something that can be demonstrated outside the moral point of view. Another difference is that Scanlon's contractualism seeks principles that no one can reasonably reject, rather than principles all would agree to.

However, Scanlon's contractualism has Kantian elements, as it seeks a free agreement that elucidates both freedom and equality. We might say that Contractualism gives expression to ideas latent in Kant's discussions of the Categorical Imperative (especially in the Formula of Humanity and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends, rather than the more familiar Formula of Universal Law).

The most influential recent contractualist is John Rawls. Rawls's contractualism differs from Scanlon's in two key ways. (1) Rawls's contract is more Kantian, as he seeks principles everyone would agree to, rather than principles no-one could reasonably reject. (This contrast is especially marked if we consider Rawls's Dewey Lectures, where his work is at its most Kantian.) (2) Rawls's contract is political — it aims to set the general social framework for a liberal society, rather than determining moral principles. As a result, Rawls places the parties to his agreement behind a veil of ignorance, where they do not know many key facts about their own identity. This is to ensure that the resulting principles of justice embody Rawls's commitment to liberal neutrality. For Rawls, we ought to follow the principles that it would be rational for everyone to choose, if they had to choose those principles without knowing anything about themselves or their circumstances. Because each person knows that they could end up being anyone, each must have concern for all. In essence, Rawls uses self-interest behind a veil of ignorance to represent a commitment to justice, construed as fairness to all.

Scanlon, by contrast, invokes no veil of ignorance. I know my own circumstances. It is not self-interest combined with ignorance of self that makes me take account of everyone's interests, but rather my concern to justify myself to everyone else. This motivation is a key feature of Scanlon's contractualism. All social contract theorists — even contractarians — agree that agents want to justify themselves to others. However, for the contractarian, such a desire is merely strategic — justification is instrumentally useful because it enables me to get others to do what serves my interests. For the Scanlonian contractualist, by contrast, agents are morally motivated by an intrinsic desire to justify themselves to others. Having this desire is part of what it is to be a moral agent.

Despite these differences, Scanlonian Contractualism does have several points in common with other contractualist theories. In particular, Scanlonian Contractualism aspires to provide a non-utilitarian theory that grounds moral status on a universal trait of persons — rational moral agency — and thus provides general principles whose scope is global. It is to this contrast with utilitarianism that we now turn. 

(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Contractualism. Ashford, Elizabeth; Mulgan, Tim.)