Don Quijote, Parte II, Capítulo XXV

—Ahora digo —dijo a esta sazón don Quijote— que el que lee mucho y anda mucho vee mucho y sabe mucho. Digo esto porque ¿qué persuasión fuera bastante para persuadirme que hay monos en el mundo que adivinen, como lo he visto ahora por mis propios ojos? Porque yo soy el mesmo don Quijote de la Mancha que este buen animal ha dicho, puesto que se ha estendido algún tanto en mis alabanzas; pero como quiera que yo me sea, doy gracias al cielo, que me dotó de un ánimo blando y compasivo, inclinado siempre a hacer bien a todos y mal a ninguno.

Kant - transzendentale Elementarlehre, Ästhetik, Logik, Analytik u. Dialektik

 

Die transzendentale Ästhetik ist der erste Teil der transzendentalen Elementarlehre in Immanuel Kants Werk der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.

Den Begriff Ästhetik verstand Kant noch in seiner ursprünglichen griechischen Bedeutung als sinnliche Wahrnehmung (von gr. Aisthesis). Die transzendentale Ästhetik ist also eine Theorie der Wahrnehmung, oder mit Kants Begriff der Sinnlichkeit als Erkenntnisgrundlage. Ihr folgt die transzendentale Logik - die Theorie vom Denken. So kommen nach Kant rein zeitlich erst die sinnlichen Anschauungen und dann das Denken. Doch Erkenntnis ist auf Anschauung und Denken gleichermaßen angewiesen.

In der transzendentalen Ästhetik behandelte Kant vorrangig die Bedeutung von Raum und Zeit für das menschliche Wahrnehmungsvermögen. Da er das Räumliche als Grundlage für die Geometrie und das Zeitliche als Grundlage für die Arithmetik ansah, ist die transzendentale Ästhetik zugleich eine Theorie darüber, wie reine Mathematik möglich ist.

Transzendentale Logik

Die reine (formale) Logik befasst sich mit den Denkregeln ohne Rücksicht auf Denkinhalte. Für die Erkenntnis ist aber die Frage grundlegend, wie diese Inhalte zustande kommen. Kant wollte daher untersuchen, welche Bedingungen das Denken überhaupt ermöglichen. Grundsätzlich galt für ihn

„daß nicht eine jede Erkenntnis a priori, sondern nur die, dadurch wir erkennen, daß und wie gewisse Vorstellungen (Anschauungen oder Begriffe) lediglich a priori angewandt werden, oder möglich sind, transzendental (d.i. die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis oder der Gebrauch derselben a priori) heißen müsse.“ (B 80)

Gesucht sind also Bedingungen, unter denen Begriffe unabhängig von Erfahrung gebildet werden, sowie der Inhalt solcher reinen Begriffe. Die transzendentale Logik ist mithin eine Wissenschaft, in der Ursprung, Umfang und objektive Gültigkeit reiner Begriffe und Prinzipien des Verstandes untersucht werden.

Analytik und Dialektik

In der Analytik werden Aussagen zergliedert und auf die zugrunde liegenden Begriffe gebracht. Die Analytik enthält grundlegende Prinzipien wie den Satz der Identität oder den Satz vom Widerspruch. Die Logik trägt insofern zur Findung von Wahrheit bei, als sie aufzeigt, welche Aussagen in sich widersprüchlich sind. Sie liefert negative (ausschließende) Kriterien der Wahrheit. Positive Aussagen zur Wahrheit sind in der Logik nicht möglich, weil ein „Probierstein“ fehlt. Diesen liefert nur die sinnliche Anschauung. Der Versuch, rein aus Argumenten die Wahrheit inhaltlicher Aussagen zu begründen, ist eine „Logik des Scheins“. Dialektik verstand Kant „als eine Kritik des dialektischen Scheins.“ (B 86)

Transzendentale Analytik und Dialektik

Die transzendentale Analytik untersucht den Bereich des Denkens, in dem die reine Verstandeserkenntnis und ihre Prinzipien ohne empirische Voraussetzung gebildet werden. Gegenstand ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Begriffen und Urteilen a priori.

Die transzendentale Dialektik befasst sich hingegen mit der Kritik des „hyperphysischen Gebrauchs“ des Verstandes und der Vernunft. Ihre Themen sind die Fragen nach Gott, Freiheit und der Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Sie ist damit eine Kritik der klassischen (speziellen) Metaphysik.

ADIs PRECATÓRIOS - DISPOSITIVO

Em conclusão, o Plenário, por maioria, julgou parcialmente procedente pedido formulado em ações diretas, propostas pelo Conselho Federal da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil e pela Confederação Nacional das Indústrias - CNI, para declarar a inconstitucionalidade: a) da expressão “na data de expedição do precatório”, contida no § 2º do art. 100 da CF; b) dos §§ 9º e 10 do art. 100 da CF; c) da expressão “índice oficial de remuneração básica da caderneta de poupança”, constante do § 12 do art. 100 da CF, do inciso II do § 1º e do § 16, ambos do art. 97 do ADCT; d) do fraseado “independentemente de sua natureza”, inserido no § 12 do art. 100 da CF, para que aos precatórios de natureza tributária se apliquem os mesmos juros de mora incidentes sobre o crédito tributário; e) por arrastamento, do art. 5º da Lei 11.960/2009; e f) do § 15 do art. 100 da CF e de todo o art. 97 do ADCT (especificamente o caput e os §§ 1º, 2º, 4º, 6º, 8º, 9º, 14 e 15, sendo os demais por arrastamento ou reverberação normativa) — v. Informativos 631, 643 e 697.

Bounded rationality - Herbert Simon against optimality

Bounded rationality

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Bounded rationality is the idea that in decision-making, rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision. It was proposed by Herbert A. Simon as an alternative basis for the mathematical modeling of decision making, as used in economics and related disciplines; it complements rationality as optimization, which views decision-making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal choice given the information available.^[1] Another way to look at bounded rationality is that, because decision-makers lack the ability and resources to arrive at the optimal solution, they instead apply their rationality only after having greatly simplified the choices available. Thus the decision-maker is a satisficer, one seeking a satisfactory solution rather than the optimal one.^[2] Simon used the analogy of a pair of scissors, where one blade is the "cognitive limitations" of actual humans and the other the "structures of the environment"; minds with limited cognitive resources can thus be successful by exploiting pre-existing structure and regularity in the environment.^[1]

Some models of human behavior in the social sciences assume that humans can be reasonably approximated or described as "rational" entities (see for example rational choice theory). Many economics models assume that people are on average rational, and can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their preferences. The concept of bounded rationality revises this assumption to account for the fact that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice because of the finite computational resources available for making them.

Contents 1 Models 2 See also 3 Notes 4 References 5 External links

Models

The term is thought to have been coined by Herbert A. Simon. In Models of Man, Simon points out that most people are only partly rational, and are emotional/irrational in the remaining part of their actions. In another work, he states "boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information" (Williamson, p. 553, citing Simon). Simon describes a number of dimensions along which "classical" models of rationality can be made somewhat more realistic, while sticking within the vein of fairly rigorous formalization. These include:

• limiting what sorts of utility functions there might be.
• recognizing the costs of gathering and processing information.
• the possibility of having a "vector" or "multi-valued" utility function.

Simon suggests that economic agents use heuristics to make decisions rather than a strict rigid rule of optimization. They do this because of the complexity of the situation, and their inability to process and compute the expected utility of every alternative action. Deliberation costs might be high and there are often other concurrent economic activities also requiring decisions.

Daniel Kahneman proposes bounded rationality as a model to overcome some of the limitations of the rational-agent models in economic literature.

As decision makers have to make decisions about how and when to decide, Ariel Rubinstein proposed to model bounded rationality by explicitly specifying decision-making procedures. This puts the study of decision procedures on the research agenda.

Gerd Gigerenzer argues that most decision theorists who have discussed bounded rationality have not really followed Simon's ideas about it. Rather, they have either considered how people's decisions might be made sub-optimal by the limitations of human rationality, or have constructed elaborate optimising models of how people might cope with their inability to optimize. Gigerenzer instead proposes to examine simple alternatives to a full rationality analysis as a mechanism for decision-making, and he and his colleagues have shown that such simple heuristics frequently lead to better decisions than the theoretically optimal procedure.

From a computational point of view, decision procedures can be encoded in algorithms and heuristics. Edward Tsang argues that the effective rationality of an agent is determined by its computational intelligence. Everything else being equal, an agent that has better algorithms and heuristics could make "more rational" (more optimal) decisions than one that has poorer heuristics and algorithms.

Satisficing

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Satisficing, a portmanteau of satisfy and suffice,^[1] is a decision-making strategy that attempts to meet an acceptability threshold. This is contrasted with optimal decision-making, an approach that specifically attempts to find the best option available. A satisficing strategy may often be (near) optimal if the costs of the decision-making process itself, such as the cost of obtaining complete information, are considered in the outcome calculation.

The word satisfice was given its current meaning by Herbert A. Simon in 1956,^[2] although the idea "was first posited in Administrative Behavior, published in 1947."^[3][4] He pointed out that human beings lack the cognitive resources to optimize: we usually do not know the relevant probabilities of outcomes, we can rarely evaluate all outcomes with sufficient precision, and our memories are weak and unreliable. A more realistic approach to rationality takes into account these limitations: This is called bounded rationality.

"Satisficing" can also be regarded as combining "satisfying" and "sacrificing."^{[citation needed]} In this usage the satisficing solution satisfies some criteria and sacrifices others.

Some consequentialist theories in moral philosophy use the concept of satisficing in the same sense, though most call for optimization instead.

In decision making, satisficing explains the tendency to select the first option that meets a given need or select the option that seems to address most needs rather than the “optimal” solution.

Example: A task is to sew a patch onto a pair of jeans. The best needle to do the threading is a 4 inch long needle with a 3 millimeter eye. This needle is hidden in a haystack along with 1000 other needles varying in size from 1 inch to 6 inches. Satisficing claims that the first needle that can sew on the patch is the one that should be used. Spending time searching for that one specific needle in the haystack is a waste of energy and resources.

Satisficing also occurs in consensus building when the group looks towards a solution everyone can agree on even if it may not be the best.

Example: A group spends hours projecting the next fiscal year's budget. After hours of debating they eventually reach a consensus, only to have one person speak up and ask if the projections are correct. When the group becomes upset at the question, it is not because this person is wrong to ask, but rather because they have come up with a solution that works. The projection may not be what will actually come, but the majority agrees on one number and thus the projection is good enough to close the book on the budget.

In many circumstances, the individual may be uncertain about what constitutes a satisfactory outcome. For example, an individual who only seeks a satisfactory retirement income may not know what level of wealth is required—given uncertainty about future prices—to ensure a satisfactory income. In this case, the individual can only evaluate outcomes on the basis of their probability of being satisfactory.

If the individual chooses that outcome which has the maximum chance of being satisfactory, then this individual's behavior is theoretically indistinguishable from that of an optimizing individual under certain conditions^[6][7][8]

Satisficing is often a good option when making a decision, but it can also be detrimental if used the wrong way. For example, when considering a medical issue such as a diagnosis, satisficing is not the best decision making strategy to use. On the other hand, when choosing an outfit or an option from a menu, it can be helpful. When there is an unlimited amount of information available and it is necessary to eliminate options, satisficing is beneficial because it helps the person making the decision effectively and efficiently reach a conclusion.^[9]