Classificação das Contribuições Especiais - Tributário

CONTRIBUIÇÕES - Direito Tributário

TRIBUTOS EM ESPÉCIE


CONTRIBUIÇÕES ESPECIAIS

As contribuições são tributos destinados ao financiamento de gastos específicos, sobrevindo no contexto de intervenção do Estado no campo social, econômico, sempre no cumprimento dos ditames da política de governo.

Art. 149 caput – discrimina as seguintes contribuições federais:

I- Contribuições Sociais
II – Contribuições de Intervenção no domínio econômico; e
III- Contribuições de Interesse das categorias profissionais ou econômicas.

Vamos ao estudo das Contribuições

a) Contribuição de Interesse das Categorias Profissionais ou Econômicas
As Contribuições de interesse de categorias profissionais (dos trabalhadores) ou econômicas (dos empregadores, por ex., do Sindicato Nacional da Indústria de Componentes de Veículos Automotores – Sindipeças), também chamadas de contribuições profissionais ou corporativas são de competência exclusiva da União.

Há dois bons exemplos deste tributo:

a) Contribuição-anuidade
b) Contribuição sindical

Contribuição Anuidade – visa prover de recursos (anuidades) os órgãos controladores e fiscalizadores das profissões, isto é, os Conselhos Regionais de Fiscalização (CREA, CRM, CRC, CRE entre outros), cujas atividades são legalmente reputadas como de interesse público. Tais órgãos ou parafiscos são geralmente, pessoas jurídicas de direito público (autarquias), que se colocam como sujeitos ativos (art. 119 CTN) de uma relevante contribuição profissional ou corporativa

Contribuição sindical - vulgarmente tem recebi o impróprio nome de imposto sindical.
A contribuição sindical possui inafastável feição tributária e, sujeitando-se às normas gerais de direitos tributário, torna-se obrigatória a todos os trabalhadores celetistas, integrantes da categoria, sindicalizados ou não. Naturalmente, não se estende àqueles vinculados a regimes próprios de previdência, como os servidores públicos.

Ver : Art. 578 e 579 da CLT

Assim, tais trabalhadores devem arcar com o pagamento do montante equivalente à importância de um dia de trabalho, consoante o inciso I do art. 580 da CLT, segundo o qual a contribuição sindical será recolhida, de uma só vez, anualmente, e constituirá na importância correspondente à remuneração de 1 (um) dia de trabalho, para os empregados, qualquer que seja a forma da referida
remuneração.

Contribuição sindical # Contribuição confederativa

Contribuição confederativa é exigida dos filiados à entidade sindical respectiva – é obrigatória a eles, para o exercício eficaz do direito de oposição.

Ver: art. 8º, IV “parte inicial” da CF e Precedente Normativo n. 119 do TST

Ver Sumula n. 666 do STF - a contribuição confederativa de que trata o artigo 8º, IV da Constituição, só é exigível dos filiados ao sindicato respectivo.

Frise-se que os membros de organização sindical têm a faculdade de não pagá-la, desligando-se do sindicato, caso lhes apraza, e mesmo assim, podem se manter aptos ao exercício da atividade profissional ou econômica.


A SINDICAL, TRIBUTO É; CONFEDERATIVA, TRIBUTO NÃO É.


b) Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico

As contribuições de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico, também chamadas contribuições interventivas ou, simplesmente, de CIDEs, são de competência exclusiva da União. O Brasil é um Estado intervencionista, propenso a adotar medidas voltadas ao comando da vida econômica por meio de sua atuação estatal.

Há dois bons exemplos deste tributo:

a) a CIDE – Combustíveis

- CIDE- Combustíveis – instituída pela Lei 10.336/2001, incide sobre a importação e a comercialização de petróleo e gás natural – e seus derivados – e, álcool etílico combustível.

Destinação: foi concebido para destinar os recursos arrecadados ao financiamento de projetos ambientais, programa de infraestrutura de transportes e pagamento de subsídio a preços ou transporte de combustíveis.

- O texto constitucional não traz especificidades sobre as hipóteses de incidência das CIDEs, porém, exterioriza detalhes afetos ao alcance da exação, consoante a dicção dos arts. 149, § 2º II e 177, § 4º, ambos da CF

- São contribuintes: o produtor, o formulador e o importador, pessoa física ou jurídica que realizem operações de importação e de comercialização, no mercado interno de vários combustíveis, quais sejam: gasolina, diesel; querosene de aviação e outros querosenes, óleos combustíveis etc

- Base de cálculo da CIDE é a unidade de medida legal para os produtos importados e comercializados no mercado interno, enquanto as alíquotas são específicas (art. 5.º da Lei 10.336/01)

Outras contribuições de intervenção no domínio econômico (CIDEs):

a contribuição exigida pelo extinto IAA (Instituto de Açúcar e do Álcool);
contribuição exigida pelo extinto IBC (Instituto Brasileiro do Café);
Adicional ao Frete para Renovação da Marinha Mercante – AFRMM;
Adicional de Tarifa Portuária – ATP etc


c) Contribuições Sociais

Desde já, é importante destacar que, em 16 de março de 2007, publicou-se a Lei 11.457, unificando duas Receitas – a Secretaria da Receita Federal e a Secretaria da Receita Previdenciária – em um único órgão, ou seja, a Secretaria da Receita Federal do Brasil (SRFB) ou Super-Receita.

Segundo o STF, entende-se como contribuições sociais:

- as contribuições sociais gerais (aquelas não destinadas à seguridade)
– A contribuição do salário-educação e as contribuições do Sistema S
- as contribuições de seguridade social (social-previdenciária)
– As contribuições nominadas, previstas no artigo 195, I a IV da CF
- as “outras” contribuições – chamadas contribuições residuais – art. 195, § 4º da CF


1) Contribuições sociais gerais

Características principais:

- são de competência da União;
- são regidas pelo mesmo regime jurídico das demais contribuições previstas no art. 149;
- sujeitam-se de forma integral ao regime constitucional tributário, sem comportar exceções
- são instituídas por lei ordinária e obedecem ao princípio da anterioridade comum;
- custeiam a atuação do Estado em outros campos sociais, diversos daqueles previstos no art. 195 da CF, quais sejam, saúde, previdência e assistência social, pertencentes à Seguridade Social e financiados pelas contribuições da seguridade social;
- só podem incidir sobre uma única base econômica, por contribuinte, para cada objetivo determinado

São elas:

- contribuição ao salário-educação – foi concebida para financiar, como adicional, o ensino fundamental público, como prestação subsidiária da empresa ao dever constitucional do Estado de manter o ensino primário gratuito de seus empregados e filhos destes.
Prevista no artigo 212, § 5º da CF..

- contribuição destinadas ao Serviços Sociais Autônomos (Sistema “S”): tais contribuições, também denominadas “contribuições de terceiros”, são destinadas ás entidades privadas dos serviços sociais autônomos e de formação profissional vinculadas ao sistema sindical.
Tais organismos – SENAI, SESC, SESI, SENAT, SEBRAE etc, pertencentes ao chamado Sistema S, dedicam-se ao ensino fundamental profissionalizantes e à prestação de serviços no âmbito social e econômico.
Exige-se as contribuições de terceiros dos empregadores, destinando-se às entidades privadas mencionadas, uma vez que o importe arrecadado não é adequado para financiar a seguridade social, conforme exclusão no art. 240 da CF..


2- Contribuições de Seguridade Social

Objetiva custear a previdência social. Art. 195 da CF c/c Lei 8.212/91.

Princípio da anterioridade – ver artigo 195, § 6º da CF - a contribuição para seguridade social será cobrada 90 dias após a publicação da lei que a instituiu ou modificou.

Fontes Nominadas de Custeio da Seguridade Social

Art. 195, caput da CF

Inciso IV
Inciso III
Inciso II
Inciso I
Importador
Receita de loterias
Trabalhador
Empregador

1ª Fonte de Custeio da Seguridade Social: O importador

Contribuição para Seguridade Social

PIS-importação e COFINS-importação

Previsão
Art. 195, IV da CF; art. 149, § 2º I e II da CF e Lei 10.865/2004

Fato Gerador

A entrada de bens estrangeiros no território nacional ou o pagamento, o crédito, a entrega, o emprego ou a remessa de valores a residentes ou a domiciliados no exterior, como contraprestação por serviço prestado (art. 3º da Lei 10.865/04)

Base de Cálculo

(I) o valor aduaneiro que servir de base para o cálculo do Imposto de importação acrescido do valor
de ICMS incidente no desembaraço aduaneiro e do valor das próprias contribuições, quando o fato gerador for a entrada de bens estrangeiros no território nacional;
ou (II) o valor pago ou creditado, entregue, empregado ou remetido para o exterior, antes da retenção do IR acrescido do ISS e do valor das próprias contribuições incidentes na importação do serviço

Sujeito Passivo

(I) o importador, pessoa física ou jurídica, que promova a entrada de bens estrangeiros no território
nacional ou contrate serviços de residente ou domiciliado no exterior; e
(II) o beneficiário do serviço, na hipótese em que o contratante também seja residente ou domiciliado no exterior (art. 1º e § 1º da Lei 10.865/04)

Sujeito Ativo

Secretaria da Receita Federal do Brasil (SRFB)

2ª Fonte de Custeio da Seguridade Social:

a receita de loterias

Contribuição para a Seguridade Social

Contribuição sobre a Receita de Concursos de Prognósticos

Previsão
Art. 195, III, da CF c/c art. 212 do Decreto nº 3.048/99

Fato Gerador

Auferir receita de concursos de prognósticos

Base de cálculo

Receita líquida (total da arrecadação) ou a Receita Bruta (movimento global de apostas) do concurso de prognósticos

Sujeito Passivo

Entidade que realiza o concurso de prognóstico (órgão do Poder Público ou organismos privados)

Sujeito Ativo

Secretaria da Receita Federal do Brasil (SRFB)

3ª Fonte de Custeio da Seguridade Social:

o trabalhador

Contribuição para a Seguridade Social

Contribuição Social do Trabalhador

Previsão
Art. 195, II da CF

Fato Gerador

Remuneração paga ou creditada pelos serviços prestados pelo segurado, independentemente do título que lhe seja dado (art. 201 do decreto n. 3048/99)

Base de cálculo

Salário-de-contribuição (art. 214, I e II, do Decreto n. 3048/99).

As alíquotas variam de 8% a 11% (MPS n. 142/2007 e Portaria n. 48/2009)

Sujeito Passivo

Trabalhador (segurado empregado, incluindo o doméstico e o trabalhador avulso)

Sujeito Ativo

Secretaria da Receita Federal do Brasil (SRFB)

4ª Fonte de Custeio da Seguridade Social:

o empregador e a empresa

São contribuições para a Seguridade Social, incidentes sobre o empregador e a empresa:

- contribuição Social Patronal sobre a Folha de Pagamentos;
- contribuição ao PIS/PASEP
- contribuição sobre o Lucro Líquido (CSLL)
- contribuição para Financiamento da Seguridade Social (COFINS)

3- “Outras” Contribuições Sociais

O STF intitula outras contribuições aquelas que podem ser instituídas no plano da competência residual da União, conforme o disposto no artigo 195, § 4º da CF e art. 154, I da CF.

Devem obedecer os seguintes parâmetros:
-instituição por lei complementar, vedando-se a utilização de medida provisória (art. 62, § 1º, III da CF);
- instituídas pela União
- respeito ao princípio da não cumulatividade;

Sam Mendes’s 25 Rules for Directors

By Bennett Marcus

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by Ilya S. Savenok/Getty Images.

“Don’t be scared of feeling like a complete tit.” –Sam Mendes

At its spring gala, the Roundabout Theatre Company honored Sam Mendes, prolific director of theater—his King Lear and Charlie and the Chocolate Factory are both currently playing in London—and films, including Skyfall and American Beauty.

The event, at the Hammerstein Ballroom in Manhattan, included speeches and performances from Helen Mirren, Jeremy Irons, Liam Neeson, and Alan Cumming, who did a number from Cabaret, which Mendes is bringing to Broadway this season. Some Mendes collaborators weighed in via video, including one clip in which Judi Dench and Daniel Craig joined in singing “Cabaret.”

After reviewing his career highlights, in depth, the British Academy Award winner said, “One of the things I love about Americans is you do massive ego trips incredibly well. Blimey. I don’t think I’ve ever seen so many photographs of myself. I didn’t even know they existed.” Mendes also noted that while tributes are wonderful, they are backward looking, and then decided to share what he’s learned along the way. “If there are any directors out there in the audience, or anyone who’s interested in directing, I’ve written 25 steps towards becoming a happier director. These are them:

1. Always choose good collaborators. It seems so obvious, but the best collaborators are the ones who disagree with you. It means they’re passionate, they have opinions, and they’ll only ever say yes if they mean it.

2. Try to learn how to make the familiar strange, and the strange familiar. Direct Shakespeare like it’s a new play, and treat every new play as if it’s Shakespeare.

3. If you have the chance, please work with Dame Judi Dench.

4. Learn to say, “I don’t know the answer.” It could be the beginning of a very good day’s rehearsal. 

5. Go to the ancient amphitheater at Epidaurus, in Greece. It makes you realize what you are a part of, and it will change the way you look at the world. If you’re an artist, you will feel central, and you will never feel peripheral again.

6. Avoid, please, all metaphors of plays or films as “pinnacles” or “peaks”; treat with absolute scorn the word “definitive”; and if anyone uses the word “masterpiece,” they don’t know what they’re doing. The pursuit of perfection is a mug’s game.

7. If you are doing a play or a film, you have to have a secret way in if you are directing it. Sometimes it’s big things. American Beauty, for me, was about my adolescence. Road to Perdition was about my childhood. Skyfall was about middle-age and mortality. Sometimes it’s small things. Maybe it’s just a simple idea. What if we do the whole thing in the nightclub, for example. But it’s not enough just to admire a script, you have to have a way in that is yours, and yours alone. 

8. Confidence is essential, but ego is not.

9. Theater is the writer’s medium and the actor’s medium; the director comes a distant third. If you want a proper ego trip, direct movies.

10. Buy a good set of blinkers. Do not read reviews. It’s enough to know whether they’re good or they’re bad. When I started, artists vastly outnumbered commentators, and now, there are a thousand published public opinions for every work of art. However strong you are, confidence is essential to what you do, and confidence is a fragile thing. Protect it. As T.S. Eliot says, teach us to care, and not to care.

11. Run a theater. A play is temporary, a building is permanent. So try to create something that stays behind and will be used and loved by others.

12. You are never too old to learn something new, as I was reminded when I learned to ski with my 10-year-old son. He, of course, did it in about 10 minutes, and I spent four days slaloming up and down, looking like a complete tit. But, don’t be scared of feeling like a complete tit. It’s an essential part of the learning process.

13. There is no right and wrong, there is only interesting, and less interesting.

14. Paintings, novels, poetry, music are all superior art forms. But theater and film can steal from all of them.

15. There are no such things as “previews” on Broadway.

16. Peter Brook said, “The journey is the destination.” Do not think of product, or, god forbid, audience response. Think only of discovery and process. One of my favorite quotes from Hamlet—Polonius: “By indirections find the directions out.” 

17. Learn when to shut up. I’m still working on this one.

18. When you have a cast of 20, this means you have 20 other imaginations in the room with you. Use them. 

19. Please remember the Oscars are a TV show.

20. Get on with it. Robert Frost said, “Tell everything a little faster.” He wasn’t wrong.

21. The second production of a musical is always better than the first.

22. Learn to accept the blame for everything. If the script was poor, you didn’t work hard enough with the writer. If the actors failed, you failed them. If the sets, the lighting, the poster, the costumes are wrong, you gave them the thumbs-up. So build up your shoulders, they need to be broad.

23. On screen, your hero can blow away 500 bad guys, but if he smokes one fucking cigarette, you’re in deep shit.

24. Always have an alternative career planned out. Mine is a cricket commentator. You will never do this career, but it might help you get to sleep at night.

25. Never, ever, ever forget how lucky you are to do something that you love.

Base rate fallacy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Base rate fallacy, also called base rate neglect or base rate bias, is an error in thinking. If presented with related base rate information (i.e. generic, general information) and specific information (information only pertaining to a certain case), the mind tends to ignore the former and focus on the latter. This is what the base rate fallacy refers to.^[1]

Contents

• 1 Example 1
• 2 Example 2
• 3 Example 3
• 4 Findings in psychology
• 5 See also
• 6 References list
• 7 External links

Example 1

John is a man who wears gothic inspired clothing, has long black hair, and listens to death metal. How likely is it that he is a Christian and how likely is it that he is a Satanist?

If people were asked this question, they would likely underestimate the probability of him being a Christian, and overestimate the probability of him being a Satanist. This is because they would ignore that the base rate of being a Christian (there are about 2 billion in the world) is vastly higher than that of being a Satanist (estimated to be in the thousands).^[2] Therefore, even if such clothing choices indicated an order of magnitude jump in probability of being a Satanist, the probability of being a Christian is still much larger.

Example 2

A group of policemen have breathalyzers displaying false drunkenness in 5% of the cases tested. However, the breathalyzers never fail to detect a truly drunk person. 1/1000 of drivers are driving drunk. Suppose the policemen then stops a driver at random, and force them to take a breathalyzer test. It indicates that he or she is drunk. We assume you don't know anything else about him or her. How high is the probability he or she really is drunk?

Many would answer as high as 0.95, but the correct probability is about 0.02.

To find the correct answer, one should use Bayes' theorem. The goal is to find the probability that the driver is drunk given that the breathalyzer indicated he/she is drunk, which can be represented as

where "D" means that the breathalyzer indicates that the driver is drunk. Bayes' Theorem tells us that

We were told the following in the first paragraph:

As you can see from the formula, one needs p(D) for Bayes' Theorem, which one can compute from the preceding values using

which gives

Plugging these numbers into Bayes' Theorem, one finds that

A more intuitive explanation: in average, for every 1000 drivers tested,

• 1 driver is drunk, and it is 100% certain that for that driver there is a true positive test result, so there is 1 true positive test result
• 999 drivers are not drunk, and among those drivers there are 5% false positive test results, so there are 49.95 false positive test results

therefore the probability that one of the drivers among the 1 + 49.95 = 50.95 positive test results really is drunk is .

The validity of this result does, however, hinge on the validity of the initial assumption that the policemen stopped the driver truly at random, and not because of bad driving. If that or another non-arbitrary reason for stopping the driver was present, then the calculation also involves the probability of a drunk driver driving competently and a non-drunk driver driving competently.

Example 3

In a city of 1 million inhabitants let there be 100 terrorists and 999,900 non-terrorists. To simplify the example, it is assumed that all people present in the city are inhabitants. Thus, the base rate probability of a randomly selected inhabitant of the city being a terrorist is 0.0001, and the base rate probability of that same inhabitant being a non-terrorist is 0.9999. In an attempt to catch the terrorists, the city installs an alarm system with a surveillance camera and automatic facial recognition software.

The software has two failure rates of 1%:

• The false negative rate: If the camera scans a terrorist, a bell will ring 99% of the time, and it will fail to ring 1% of the time.
• The false positive rate: If the camera scans a non-terrorist, a bell will not ring 99% of the time, but it will ring 1% of the time.

Suppose now that an inhabitant triggers the alarm. What is the chance that the person is a terrorist? In other words, what is P(T | B), the probability that a terrorist has been detected given the ringing of the bell? Someone making the 'base rate fallacy' would infer that there is a 99% chance that the detected person is a terrorist. Although the inference seems to make sense, it is actually bad reasoning, and a calculation below will show that the chances they are a terrorist are actually near 1%, not near 99%.

The fallacy arises from confusing the natures of two different failure rates. The 'number of non-bells per 100 terrorists' and the 'number of non-terrorists per 100 bells' are unrelated quantities. One does not necessarily equal the other, and they don't even have to be almost equal. To show this, consider what happens if an identical alarm system were set up in a second city with no terrorists at all. As in the first city, the alarm sounds for 1 out of every 100 non-terrorist inhabitants detected, but unlike in the first city, the alarm never sounds for a terrorist. Therefore 100% of all occasions of the alarm sounding are for non-terrorists, but a false negative rate cannot even be calculated. The 'number of non-terrorists per 100 bells' in that city is 100, yet P(T | B) = 0%. There is zero chance that a terrorist has been detected given the ringing of the bell.

Imagine that the city's entire population of one million people pass in front of the camera. About 99 of the 100 terrorists will trigger the alarm—and so will about 9,999 of the 999,900 non-terrorists. Therefore, about 10,098 people will trigger the alarm, among which about 99 will be terrorists. So, the probability that a person triggering the alarm actually is a terrorist, is only about 99 in 10,098, which is less than 1%, and very, very far below our initial guess of 99%.

The base rate fallacy is so misleading in this example because there are many more non-terrorists than terrorists.

Findings in psychology

In experiments, people have been found to prefer individuating information over general information when the former is available.^[3][4][5]

In some experiments, students were asked to estimate the grade point averages (GPAs) of hypothetical students. When given relevant statistics about GPA distribution, students tended to ignore them if given descriptive information about the particular student, even if the new descriptive information was obviously of little or no relevance to school performance.^[4] This finding has been used to argue that interviews are an unnecessary part of the college admissions process because interviewers are unable to pick successful candidates better than basic statistics.

Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky attempted to explain this finding in terms of a simple rule or "heuristic" called representativeness. They argued that many judgements relating to likelihood, or to cause and effect, are based on how representative one thing is of another, or of a category.^[4] Kahneman considers base rate neglect to be a specific form of extension neglect.^[6] Richard Nisbett has argued that some attributional biases like the fundamental attribution error are instances of the base rate fallacy: people underutilize "consensus information" (the "base rate") about how others behaved in similar situations and instead prefer simpler dispositional attributions.^[7]

There is considerable debate in psychology on the conditions under which people do or do not appreciate base rate information.^[8][9] Researchers in the heuristics-and-biases program have stressed empirical findings showing that people tend to ignore base rates and make inferences that violate certain norms of probabilistic reasoning, such as Bayes' theorem. The conclusion drawn from this line of research was that human probabilistic thinking is fundamentally flawed and error-prone.^[10] Other researchers have emphasized the link between cognitive processes and information formats, arguing that such conclusions are not generally warranted.^[11][12]

Consider again Example 2 from above. The required inference is to estimate the (posterior) probability that a (randomly picked) driver is drunk, given that the breathalyzer test is positive. Formally, this probability can be calculated using Bayes' theorem, as shown above. However, there are different ways of presenting the relevant information. Consider the following, formally equivalent variant of the problem:

 1 out of 1000 drivers are driving drunk. The breathalyzers never fail to detect a truly drunk person. For 50 out of the 999 drivers who are not drunk the breathalyzer falsely displays drunkness. Suppose the policemen then stop a driver at random, and force them to take a breathalyzer test. It indicates that he or she is drunk. We assume you don't know anything else about him or her. How high is the probability he or she really is drunk?

In this case, the relevant numerical information—p(drunk), p(D | drunk), p(D | sober)—is presented in terms of natural frequencies with respect to a certain reference class (see reference class problem). Empirical studies show that people's inferences correspond more closely to Bayes' rule when information is presented this way, helping to overcome base-rate neglect in laypeople^[12] and experts.^[13] As a consequence, organizations like the Cochrane Collaboration recommend using this kind of format for communicating health statistics.^[14] Teaching people to translate these kinds of Bayesian reasoning problems into natural frequency formats is more effective than merely teaching them to plug probabilities (or percentages) into Bayes' theorem.^[15] It has also been shown that graphical representations of natural frequencies (e.g., icon arrays) help people to make better inferences.^[15][16][17]

Why are natural frequency formats helpful? One important reason is that this information format facilitates the required inference because it simplifies the necessary calculations. This can be seen when using an alternative way of computing the required probability p(drunk|D):

where N(drunk ∩ D) denotes the number of drivers that are drunk and get a positive breathalyzer result, and N(D) denotes the total number of cases with a positive breathalyzer result. The equivalence of this equation to the above one follows from the axioms of probability theory, according to which N(drunk ∩ D) = p (D | drunk) × p (drunk). Importantly, although this equation is formally equivalent to Bayes’ rule, it is not psychologically equivalent. Using natural frequencies simplifies the inference because the required mathematical operation can be performed on natural numbers, instead of normalized fractions (i.e., probabilities), because it makes the high number of false positives more transparent, and because natural frequencies exhibit a "nested-set structure".^[18][19]

It is important to note that not any kind of frequency format facilitates Bayesian reasoning.^[19][20] Natural frequencies refer to frequency information that results from natural sampling,^[21] which preserves base rate information (e.g., number of drunken drivers when taking a random sample of drivers). This is different from systematic sampling, in which base rates are fixed a priori (e.g., in scientific experiments). In the latter case it is not possible to infer the posterior probability p (drunk | positive test) from comparing the number of drivers who are drunk and test positive compared to the total number of people who get a positive breathalyzer result, because base rate information is not preserved and must be explicitly re-introduced using Bayes' theorem.

See also

• Bayesian probability
• Data dredging
• False positive paradox
• Inductive argument
• List of cognitive biases
• Misleading vividness
• Prosecutor's fallacy

References list

1. "Logical Fallacy: The Base Rate Fallacy". Fallacyfiles.org. Retrieved 2013-06-15.
2. B.A. Robinson (March 2006). "Religious Satanism, 16th century Satanism, Satanic Dabbling, etc". Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance. Retrieved March 24, 2013.
3. Bar-Hillel, Maya (1980). "The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments". Acta Psychologica 44: 211–233. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90046-3.
4. Kahneman, Daniel; Amos Tversky (1973). "On the psychology of prediction". Psychological Review 80: 237–251. doi:10.1037/h0034747.
5. Kahneman, Daniel; Amos Tversky (1985). "Evidential impact of base rates". In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (Eds.). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. pp. 153–160.
6. Kahneman, Daniel (2000). "Evaluation by moments, past and future". In Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Eds.). Choices, Values and Frames.
7. Nisbett, Richard E.; E. Borgida, R. Crandall & H. Reed (1976). "Popular induction: Information is not always informative". In J. S. Carroll & J. W. Payne (Eds.). Cognition and social behavior 2. pp. 227–236.
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