Saturday, 29 September 2012

Supreme Court - New Term

Supreme Court Faces Weighty Cases and a New Dynamic

WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court returns to the bench on Monday to confront not only a docket studded with momentous issues but also a new dynamic among the justices.
Hiroko Masuike/The New York Times
Elliott Dunham-Murphy, 2, and his mother came to Manhattan in June for a rally celebrating the court’s ruling on health care.

Related

Related in Opinion

Alex Brandon/Associated Press
The term begins on Monday at the Supreme Court, which was under a protective scrim last week as facade work was being done.
The coming term will probably include major decisions on affirmative action in higher education admissions, same-sex marriage and a challenge to the heart of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Those rulings could easily rival the last term’s as the most consequential in recent memory.
The theme this term is the nature of equality, and it will play out over issues that have bedeviled the nation for decades. “Last term will be remembered for one case,” said Kannon K. Shanmugam, a lawyer with Williams & Connolly. “This term will be remembered for several.”
The term will also provide signals about the repercussions of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.’s surprise decision in June to join the court’s four more liberal members and supply the decisive fifth vote in the landmark decision to uphold President Obama’s health care law. Every decision of the new term will be scrutinized for signs of whether Chief Justice Roberts, who had been a reliable member of the court’s conservative wing, has moved toward the ideological center of the court.
“The salient question is: Is it a little bit, or is it a lot?” said Paul D. Clement, a lawyer for the 26 states on the losing side of the core of the health care decision.
The term could clarify whether the health care ruling will come to be seen as the case that helped Chief Justice Roberts protect the authority of his court against charges of partisanship while accruing a mountain of political capital in the process. He and his fellow conservative justices might then run the table on the causes that engage him more than the limits of federal power ever have: cutting back on racial preferences, on campaign finance restrictions and on procedural protections for people accused of crimes.
It is also possible that the chief justice will become yet another disappointment to conservatives, who are used to them from the Supreme Court, and that he will join Justice Anthony M. Kennedy as a swing vote at the court’s center. There is already some early evidence of this trend: in each of the last three terms, only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy were in the majority more than 90 percent of the time.
“We all start with the conventional wisdom that Justice Kennedy is going to decide the close cases,” said Mr. Clement, who served as United States solicitor general under President George W. Bush. “We’ve all been reminded that that’s not always the case.”
The texture of the new term will be different, as the court’s attention shifts from federalism and the economy to questions involving race and sexual orientation. The new issues before the court are concrete and consequential: Who gets to go to college? To get married? To vote?
On Oct. 10, the court will hear Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345, a major challenge to affirmative action in higher education. The case was brought by Abigail Fisher, a white woman who says she was denied admission to the University of Texas based on her race. The university selects part of its class by taking race into account, as one factor among many, in an effort to ensure educational diversity.
Just nine years ago, the Supreme Court endorsed that approach in a 5-to-4 vote. The majority opinion in the case, Grutter v. Bollinger, was written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who said she expected it to last for a quarter of a century.
But Justice O’Connor retired in 2006. She was succeeded by Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., who was appointed by Mr. Bush and who has consistently voted to limit race-conscious decision making by the government. Chief Justice Roberts, another Bush appointee, has made no secret of his distaste for what he has called “a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.”
Justices Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas all dissented in the Grutter case, and simple math suggests that there may now be five votes to limit or overturn it.
The reach of such a decision could be limited by the idiosyncrasies of the admissions system in Texas. The university provides automatic admission to students in Texas who graduate in roughly the top 10 percent of their high school classes. That approach generates substantial diversity, partly because many Texas high schools remain racially homogeneous.
Ms. Fisher narrowly missed the cutoff at a high school whose students have above-average test scores for the state. She was rejected for one of the remaining spots under the part of the admissions program that considers applicants’ race.
The court may uphold the Texas system under Grutter, or it may rule against it on narrow grounds by saying, for instance, that race-conscious admissions are forbidden where a race-neutral method — like the 10 percent program — can be said to be working.
But the court may also follow the health care ruling with a second landmark decision, this one barring racial preferences in admissions decisions altogether. Given persistent achievement gaps, even after controlling for family income, such a ruling would make the student bodies of many colleges less black and Hispanic and more white and Asian.
The court will probably also take on same-sex marriage. “I think it’s most likely that we will have that issue before the court toward the end of the current term,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said at the University of Colorado on Sept. 19.

Monday, 24 September 2012

ALN - JCN



du bist schön und ich glaube das weisst du
und ich bitte dich, offenbar mir deine Wahrheit,
deine Ängste deine Träume,
nimm mich als Teil davon mit
und ich bitte dich, lass mich nicht allein, denn ich kann jetzt nicht alleine sein
wie ein Echo hör ich deine Stimme im Wind
wie ein Echo hör ich unsere Stimmen im Wind.


Tu és linda e eu creio que tu o sabes
E eu peço a ti, revele a mim a tua verdade,
teus medos, teus sonhos,
Tome-me junto como uma parte disso,
E eu peço a ti, não me deixe só, pois eu agora não posso ficar sozinho
Como um eco, eu escuto tua voz no vento
Como um eco, eu escuto nossas vozes no vento.

Ich schau dich einfach an
Das könnt ich stundenlang
Und dabei frag ich mich

Wohin willst du
Wenn du nicht mehr bei mir sein kannst
Wohin willst du?
Wie weit gehst du
7 Tage, 7 Nächte lang
Ich will mit, verstehst du das.

Eu simplesmente olho para ti.
Eu conseguiria fazer isso por horas.
E, assim, pergunto-me:

Para onde tu queres ir?
Se tu não podes mais estar comigo,
Para onde tu queres ir?
Quão longe vais tu?
7 dias, 7 noites?
Eu quero ir junto, tu entendes isso?

Friday, 21 September 2012

falsa demonstratio non nocet - Fungibilidade - ZPO 300

§ 300 StPO sagt aus: „Ein Irrtum in der Bezeichnung des zulässigen Rechtsmittels ist unschädlich“.

Monday, 17 September 2012

grauissimum onus probandi - grauissimum onus argumentandi - Meinungsfreiheit - schwere Argumentationslast - schwere Beweislast - Robert Alexy

grauissimum onus probandi - grauissimum onus argumentandi - Meinungsfreiheit - schwere Argumentationslast - schwere Beweislast - Robert Alexy - heavy burden of argumentation - heavy burden of proof

Saturday, 15 September 2012

Barack Obama - DNC - End of the speech

And I think about the young sailor I met at Walter Reed hospital, still recovering from a grenade attack that would cause him to have his leg amputated above the knee. Six months ago, I would watch him walk into a White House dinner honoring those who served in Iraq, tall and twenty pounds heavier, dashing in his uniform, with a big grin on his face; sturdy on his new leg. And I remember how a few months after that I would watch him on a bicycle, racing with his fellow wounded warriors on a sparkling spring day, inspiring other heroes who had just begun the hard path he had traveled.
He gives me hope. 
I don't know what party these men and women belong to. I don't know if they'll vote for me. But I know that their spirit defines us. They remind me, in the words of Scripture, that ours is a "future filled with hope." 

And if you share that faith with me – if you share that hope with me – I ask you tonight for your vote.
If you reject the notion that this nation's promise is reserved for the few, your voice must be heard in this election.
If you reject the notion that our government is forever beholden to the highest bidder, you need to stand up in this election.
If you believe that new plants and factories can dot our landscape; that new energy can power our future; that new schools can provide ladders of opportunity to this nation of dreamers; if you believe in a country where everyone gets a fair shot, and everyone does their fair share, and everyone plays by the same rules, then I need you to vote this November.
America, I never said this journey would be easy, and I won't promise that now. Yes, our path is harder – but it leads to a better place. Yes our road is longer – but we travel it together. We don't turn back. We leave no one behind. We pull each other up. We draw strength from our victories, and we learn from our mistakes, but we keep our eyes fixed on that distant horizon, knowing that Providence is with us, and that we are surely blessed to be citizens of the greatest nation on Earth.
Thank you, God bless you, and may God bless these United States.

Saturday, 8 September 2012

Pareto efficiency and Arrow's impossibility theorem

Arrow's impossibility theorem

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In social choice theory, Arrow’s impossibility theorem, the General Possibility Theorem, or Arrow’s paradox, states that, when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no rank order voting system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting a specific set of criteria. These criteria are called unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The theorem is often cited in discussions of election theory as it is further interpreted by the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem.
The theorem is named after economist Kenneth Arrow, who demonstrated the theorem in his Ph.D. thesis and popularized it in his 1951 book Social Choice and Individual Values. The original paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare".[1]
In short, the theorem states that no rank-order voting system can be designed that satisfies these three "fairness" criteria:
  • If every voter prefers alternative X over alternative Y, then the group prefers X over Y.
  • If every voter's preference between X and Y remains unchanged, then the group's preference between X and Y will also remain unchanged (even if voters' preferences between other pairs like X and Z, Y and Z, or Z and W change).
  • There is no "dictator": no single voter possesses the power to always determine the group's preference.
Voting systems that use cardinal utility (which conveys more information than rank orders; see the subsection discussing the cardinal utility approach to overcoming the negative conclusion) are not covered by the theorem. The theorem can also be sidestepped by weakening the notion of independence. Arrow, like many economists[citation needed], rejected cardinal utility as a meaningful tool for expressing social welfare, and so focused his theorem on preference rankings.[citation needed]
The axiomatic approach Arrow adopted can treat all conceivable rules (that are based on preferences) within one unified framework. In that sense, the approach is qualitatively different from the earlier one in voting theory, in which rules were investigated one by one. One can therefore say that the contemporary paradigm of social choice theory started from this theorem.[3]




Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is a concept in economics with applications in engineering. The term is named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian economist who used the concept in his studies of economic efficiency and income distribution.
In a Pareto efficient economic allocation, no one can be made better off without making at least one individual worse off. Given an initial allocation of goods among a set of individuals, a change to a different allocation that makes at least one individual better off without making any other individual worse off is called a Pareto improvement. An allocation is defined as "Pareto efficient" or "Pareto optimal" when no further Pareto improvements can be made.
Pareto efficiency is a minimal notion of efficiency and does not necessarily result in a socially desirable distribution of resources: it makes no statement about equality, or the overall well-being of a society.[1][2]
The notion of Pareto efficiency can also be applied to the selection of alternatives in engineering and similar fields. Each option is first assessed under multiple criteria and then a subset of options is identified with the property that no other option can categorically outperform any of its members.