Kenodoxia: one-fingered salute

KENODOXIA:

 

[A]

ΕΣΚΙΜΑΛΙΧΘΑΙ

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Ἐσκιμαλίχθαι σε χρή. Hoc gestu contumeliam despectumque supremum significabant. Est enim Graecis ἐσκιμαλίσαι medium digitum ostendere con- tractis caeteris, ignominiae causa, aut strepitu digitorum significare contemp- tum. Vnde et apud Iuuenalem, quod alibi retulimus:  Mandaret laqueum mediumque ostenderet vnguem. Suidas citat ex Aristophane senarium hunc•, [F] extat autem ἐν Εἰρήνῃ:  Ὁ δὲ δρεπανουργὸς οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς ἤδεται,  [A] Καὶ τὸν δορυξόον• οἷον ἐσκιμάλισεν;  [F] id est  An non vides, vt gestiat falcis faber 233  Medioque monstret vngue lancearium? [A] Quid autem proprie significet ἐσκιμαλίζειν, qui scire cupiet, malo e Suida• discat quam ex me. Elegantius magisque prouerbialiter ad fortunam, ad 234 eruditionem aut aliud quippiam, quod plane contemnitur, detorquebitur.

http://jvpoll.home.xs4all.nl/back/Web/erasmusa23.htm

Tuesday, February 07, 2012

One-fingered salute

So, it turns out that M.I.A. made a particular unidigital gesture during a Super Bowl performance.  Cue apologies similar to those that followed a wardrobe malfunction on a previous show.  The BBC report wonders how old the gesture might be and points to Diogenes the Cynic.  Diogenes Laertius (6.34) reports:

ξένων δέ ποτε θεάσασθαι θελόντων Δημοσθένην, τὸν μέσον δάκτυλον ἐκτείνας, “οὗτος ὑμῖν,” ἔφη,“ἐστὶν ὁ Ἀθηναίων δημαγωγός. 

When some friends from out of town wanted to do and see Demosthenes, he stretched out his middle finger and said, "This is the Athenians' demagogue".

It seems that there was little love lost between Diogenes and Demosthenes.  And Diogenes is not averse to a bit of shocking behaviour so perhaps it is a gesture of contempt.  But I wasn't not sure whether what he have here is an insulting gesture of contempt aimed at his guest-friends for wanting to go and see Demosthenes in action.

A similar story appears in Epictetus 3.2.11:

οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι Διογένης τῶν σοφιστῶν τινα οὕτως ἔδειξεν ἐκτείνας τὸν μέσον δάκτυλον, εἶτα ἐκμανέντος αὐτοῦ ‘Οὗτός ἐστιν’, ἔφη, ‘ὁ δεῖνα· ἔδειξα ὑμῖν αὐτόν’;

Anyway, a quick TLG search seems to confirm that it is more or less the gesture we know now.  Scholiasts on Aristophanes Clouds (ad 653 and 549) suggest as much.  And here is the Suda:

The verb is σκιμᾱλίζω,'to hold up the middle finger': 

Ἐσκιμάλισεν

τῷ μέσῳ δακτύλῳ συναρμόσας τὸν μέγαν καὶ πλήξας ἐφυβρίζει. ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ  κατεδακτύλισε· σκιμαλίσαι γάρ ἐστι κυρίως τὸ μέσον τὸν δάκτυλον εἰς τὸν πρωκτὸν τοῦ ὀρνέου ἐμβαλεῖν. οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν βουλόμενοι ἐνυβρίσαι τινά, τὸν μέσον δάκτυλον ἐντείνοντες καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς συνάγοντες δείξωσιν αὐτῷ. Ἀριστοφάνης· καὶ τὸν δορυξὸν οἷον ἐσκιμάλισεν.

So, it is principally to do with shoving a middle finger up a bird's anus and also can be used to insult someone.

Standards of judicial review: USA v. Germany

Strict scrutiny; intermediate scrutiny; rational basis review/minimum scrutiny

intensivierte inhaltliche Kontrolle; Vertretbarkeitskontrolle; Evidenzkontrolle

[ALEXY, p. 427; BVerfGE 50, 290 (333); OSSENBÜHL, aaO, p. 501]

To pass strict scrutiny, the law or policy must satisfy three tests:

It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. While the Courts have never brightly defined how to determine if an interest is compelling, the concept generally refers to something necessary or crucial, as opposed to something merely preferred. Examples include national security, preserving the lives of multiple individuals, and not violating explicit constitutional protections.

The law or policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal or interest. If the government action encompasses too much (overbroad) or fails to address essential aspects of the compelling interest, then the rule is not considered narrowly tailored.

The law or policy must be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest, that is, there cannot be a less restrictive way to effectively achieve the compelling government interest. The test will be met even if there is another method that is equally the least restrictive. Some legal scholars consider this "least restrictive means" requirement part of being narrowly tailored, though the Court generally evaluates it separately.

 

 

 

Standards of Review

1.  Strict Scrutiny

Strict scrutiny requires that the government prove it has chosen a narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling governmental objective. The means required under such a test are usually described as narrowly tailored and occasionally described as necessary, but the hallmark of strict scrutiny is that the government must choose the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling government objective.  Under this test, the burden is on the government to prove that it has a compelling objective and that there are no equally effective less restrictive alternative means available to achieve that objective.  In proving the existence of a compelling objective, the government cannot simply assert such an interest, it must show that the compelling objective is the real reason for its actions and that the objective actually is at risk if it refrains from regulation.

a.  Equal Protection Strict Scrutiny: Is the use of the classification necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental objective? (necessary under this test means that the objective cannot be achieved without the use of the classification) (sometimes the phrase narrowly tailored is used instead of necessary, but in the context of strict scrutiny narrowly tailored means necessary)
b.  Due Process Strict Scrutiny: Are the means narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling governmental objective? (narrowly tailored - the means are necessary and there are no equally effective less restrictive alternative means available to accomplish the objective) (sometimes the word necessary is used instead of narrowly tailored, but in the context of strict scrutiny they mean the same thing)
 
2.  Intermediate Scrutiny

Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government prove it is acting to further an important or substantial government interest and that it has chosen a narrowly tailored means to achieve its important objective. To satisfy the requirement of narrow tailoring of the means employed under intermediate scrutiny, the government does not need to select the least restrictive means, as it does under strict scrutiny.  Instead, the government must show that the means are narrowly tailored in that there is a close fit between means and ends.  This can be shown by demonstrating that the means are not substantially broader than they need to be to protect the important government interest.  As one method of determining if the means employed are substantially broader than they need to be, courts will often examine available less restrictive alternatives even though the government is not required to choose the least restrictive alternative.

a.  Equal Protection Intermediate Scrutiny: Is the use of the classification substantially related to the accomplishment of an important governmental objective? (this test requires that the use of the classification be narrowly tailored to the accomplishment of an important governmental objective so that it is neither substantially overinclusive nor substantially underinclusive, but it does not require that it be absolutely necessary to the accomplishment of the objective).
b.  Due Process Intermediate Scrutiny: Are the means substantially related to the accomplishment of an important governmental objective? (this test does not require the least restrictive means but only a means that are a close fit to the government's objective and are not substantially broader than necessary to accomplish the important objective) (sometimes the phrase narrowly tailored is used instead of substantially related, but in the context of intermediate scrutiny narrowly tailored means substantially related) (Important Note: we did not read any cases in which the Court specifically applied intermediate scrutiny in the context of due process review although we did see the court talk about important rather than compelling objectives in Zablocki and we did see the Court use the phrase "rigorous review" when it didn't want to make clear whether it was using strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny since rigorous review can refer to either strict or intermediate scrutiny).

3.  Minimum Scrutiny

Minimum Scrutiny (also called rational basis review and minimum rationality review) is the least demanding level of scrutiny.  This standard requires that the challenger prove that the means employed by the government are not rationally related to any legitimate government interest.

a.  Equal Protection Minimum Scrutiny: Is the use of the classification rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective?
b.  Due Process Minimum Scrutiny: Are the means rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective?
  

 

 

 

Abstrakte Normenkontrolle, Art. 93 I Nr. 2 GG, § 76 BVerfGG

Objektives Rechtsbeanstandungsverfahren, unabhängig von Rechtsanwendungsstreit

(Problem der Abgrenzung von Recht und Politik auf die Spitze getrieben)

1.      Antragsberechtigung

      Nicht kontradiktorisches Verfahren, nur Stellungnahmen

2.      Antragsgegenstand

3.   Antragsbefugnis

Für-nichtig-Halten (Rspr.) oder Zweifel/Meinungsverschiedenheiten (Lit.)

Objektives Klarstellungsinteresse statt Geltendmachung eigener Rechte oder subjektivem Rechtsschutzbedürfnis

Schutzpflichten aus Grundrechten, insb. bei Art 2 II 1 GG (i. V. m. Art. 1 I GG) (auch bei Art. 2 I (Schwächerenschutz in Vertragsbeziehungen), 14 I GG anerkannt)

1. Eröffnung des Schutzbereichs

2. Bestehen einer Schutzpflicht (Problem der Herleitung, „Schutz“ der Menschenwürde, objektiv-rechtlicher Gehalt der Grundrechte)

3. Verletzung der Schutzpflicht (Problem der Kontrolldichte, mögliche Prüfungsmaßstäbe: Evidenzkontrolle, Vertretbarkeitskontrolle oder intensivierte inhaltliche Kontrolle; je nach Rang des geschützten Rechtsguts, Schwere des zu befürchtenden Eingriffs, Abwägung mit gesetzgeberischen Zielen; „Maßstab“: Effektivität des Grundrechtsschutzes, Untermaßverbot)

Zu Fall 2: Schwangerschaftsabbruch I (BVerfGE 39, 1; vgl. auch E 88, 203)

Problemschwerpunkte: Artikel 1 I, 2 II 1 GG

Welches Grundrecht? Verkopplung von Lebens- und Menschenwürdeschutz?

Persönlicher Schutzbereich: nasciturus?

Objektiv-rechtlicher Gehalt: Schutz durch Eingriff?

Abwägung mit Rechten der schwangeren Frau nicht möglich (?)

Welche Pflichten stellt das „Untermaßverbot“ auf?

Schutzniveau: Indikationen sind Fallgruppen der Unzumutbarkeit für die Frau, die Rechtspflicht zur Austragung des Kindes zu erfüllen.

Strafpflicht aus Grundrechten?

Zu Fall 3: Lüth (BVerfGE 7, 198)

Problemschwerpunkte: Artikel 5 I, II GG

Liberales Grundrechtssystem als verfassungsrechtliche Grundentscheidung für alle Bereiche des Rechts (sog. objektive Wertordnung)

Generalklauseln des Zivilrechts als „Einbruchstellen“ der Grundrechte (hier § 826 BGB)

Boykottbegriff (konkrete Umstände beachten!) und Zentralgrundrecht der Meinungsfreiheit (freier Kampf der Meinungen, für Demokratie konstituierend)

„Allgemeine Gesetze“ als Schranken der Meinungsfreiheit: Sonderrechtslehre und Abwägungslehre

Abwägung: Motive, Ziel, Zweck, Maß der Äußerungen incl. Form und Wirkung?